The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), adopted in 1998, was the first multilateral treaty to explicitly codify the conscription, enlistment, or use of children under the age of 15 in hostilities as a war crime. Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) addresses this in the context of international armed conflicts, while Article 8(2)(e)(vii) extends it to non-international armed conflicts. This legal codification marked a historic milestone in the fight against child soldiering, providing a clear prosecutorial pathway for holding commanders criminally responsible. However, more than two decades later, the ICC’s record on this issue reflects the tensions between international justice, political influence, and operational capacity. The ICC’s most prominent precedent came in the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (2012), where the Congolese warlord was convicted for conscripting and enlisting children under 15 into the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and using them in hostilities in the Ituri region of the DRC. The Lubanga case established the evidentiary standard for proving recruitment, including reliance on eyewitness testimony, photographic evidence, and demobilization records. While hailed as a landmark verdict, its deterrent value has been limited, since 2012, recruitment has persisted in the DRC, South Sudan, and Myanmar, often with greater sophistication and reduced traceability. Subsequent ICC prosecutions, such as Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (2019), expanded accountability to include sexual slavery of children within armed groups, recognizing the interconnection between recruitment and other crimes against humanity. Yet the scope of prosecutions remains narrow, largely confined to sub-Saharan African conflicts. This geographic concentration has fueled criticism, particularly from legal analysts, that the ICC has become a selective enforcement mechanism, targeting politically weaker states while ignoring violations by actors in the Middle East, Asia, or powerful permanent members of the UN Security Council. Enforcement challenges begin with jurisdiction. The ICC can only prosecute crimes committed on the territory of a State Party or by nationals of a State Party, unless the UN Security Council refers a case. This has allowed non-signatory states such as China, Russia, and the United States to shield themselves and their allies from ICC scrutiny. Alleged recruitment of child soldiers by Russian-backed militias in eastern Ukraine, Iranian-sponsored militias in Syria and Gaza, and Myanmar’s military junta remain outside the ICC’s active caseload, despite credible evidence gathered by NGOs and journalists. Another barrier is command responsibility proof. Prosecutors must establish that the accused knew, or should have known, about the recruitment and failed to prevent or punish it. In fractured militia networks, leaders often operate through layers of intermediaries, creating plausible deniability. Some groups deliberately decentralize recruitment, relying on local warlords or criminal gangs to handle abductions, ensuring that top leadership remains insulated from direct evidence trails. Resource constraints further weaken the ICC’s reach. The Court’s budget, just over €170 million in 2025, is insufficient to sustain complex, multi-year investigations in unstable conflict zones. Field access is often blocked by security threats, non-cooperation from governments, or outright expulsion of investigators. Even when arrest warrants are issued, enforcement depends on state cooperation; fugitives like Joseph Kony remain at large decades after indictment. The ICC’s utility lies not in its symbolic declarations but in its capacity to impose credible consequences. This means narrowing its focus to enforceable cases, avoiding politically motivated selectivity, and forging partnerships with national militaries and intelligence agencies to secure arrests. The United States, while not a party to the Rome Statute, has nonetheless played a role in facilitating some arrests through intelligence sharing, demonstrating that cooperation outside formal jurisdiction is both possible and effective. The ICC’s challenge moving forward is not a lack of legal tools, the Rome Statute’s provisions are unambiguous, but a failure of political will among both signatories and the international community. Until major powers treat the recruitment of children as a red line comparable to chemical weapons use, the Court will remain a reactive institution, punishing a few symbolic offenders while systemic abuse continues.